ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR
"ETHNICITY, INSURGENCY, AND CIVIL WAR"

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1 Introduction

"Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" (Fearon and Laitin 2003) mentions a large number of results that we lacked space properly to report in the confines of the *American Political Science Review*. This note provides additional tables that give specifics and details for the claims we made that are not documented in Table 1 of that article. The tables given below report the missing results roughly in the order they are mentioned in the published article. We also provide, in an Appendix, a list of the conflicts we identified as "civil wars" meeting the criteria given in the article.

2 Additional information on coding procedures

The sources and codings of the variables listed in the tables are mainly given in the article. We provide some additional information on the construction of certain variables here.

Per Capita Income: We started with the Penn World Tables 5.6 for real per capita income (chain index), measured in 1985 U.S. dollars. This series starts in 1950 and ends in 1992, and provides estimates for 4,243 of our 6,610 country years (64%).[1] We then used the estimates of growth rate of per capita income provided in the 2001 World Development Indicators (WDI, published by the World Bank) to extend these estimates forward to 1999 and backwards to the first year of independence or 1960 (the first year in the WDI data) where possible. This added another 1,116 observations (17% of country years).[2]

[1]The Appendix of the Penn World Tables 5.6 release provides some estimates for 1990 and 1991 for former Soviet republics, in current dollars. We used these to calculate republic income relative to the Soviet Union, which we then used in conjunction with the estimate for the 1991 income in the Soviet Union in 1985 dollars to estimate this quantity in 1991 for the former republics.

[2]For a few countries, we used estimates available in the 1999 WDI data that are missing from the 2001 collection. In addition, a data set available for a time at the World Bank web site, produced by William Easterly and ... Hu, proved to contain growth rate estimates for some country years missing from the WDI

Next, for each country with at least 11 complete observations, we regressed the log of the income estimates we had at this point on year and the log of per capita energy consumption, as given by the Correlates of War Project (COW) National Capabilities Data. We then used predicted values as estimates where possible. The energy consumption data are available for 1945 to 1992, and overall correlate strongly with the per capita income estimates, at .90 for their 4129 common observations. With the dependent variable in logs, including year as a regressor fits a linear time trend in the growth rate, which for most countries is quite pronounced. Thus the fit country by country is typically very good, making for plausible estimates of missing years within series of estimates, and the missing data for many countries between 1945 and 1949. This step produced estimates for an additional 491 country years, or 7.4% of the total.[3]

There remain several countries that have no income estimates in either the Penn World Tables 5.6 or the World Bank's published data, but which nonetheless have estimates of energy consumption in the COW data.[4] For these and for countries with fewer than 11 common energy and income estimates, we regressed, using all countries with data, the log of income on (a) the interaction of region and log energy consumption per capita, (b) the interaction of region and year, and (c) a dummy for whether the country was an oil exporter (see the definition in the published article). We then used the predicted values for countries with energy consumption data but no income data at this point. In effect, then, we are setting these countries' incomes for a given year to the average of countries in the same region and year with the same energy consumption per capita, adjusted for whether the country is an oil exporter. The R^2 for this regression is .88. This step produces estimates for 533 additional country years, or 8.1% of the total.

Two hundred and twenty seven or 3.4% of the country years have no income or energy consumption estimates. These are left as missing in the data analysis in the published paper and in Tables 1-17 below. These country years contain five for which we code civil wars as beginning – Croatia 1992, Bosnia 1992, Djibouti 1993, Yemen 1994, and Afghanistan 1992. To check to see if the exclusion of these cases is materially affecting our results, we used the method of multiple imputation (Rubin 1987) to reestimate Model 3 in Table 1 of the published article. This approach and the results are discussed in the next section below.[5]

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collections, in particular Taiwan in the 1990s.

[3]We used only countries with 11 common observations because if one uses fewer, a couple of Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria are predicted to have absurdly low incomes in the 1940s and 50s, due to the backwards projection of a linear growth trend based on the 1980s over "too many" years.

[4]Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Vietnam, and the two Yemens prior to 1991 are examples. Note that all but Albania and Libya had civil wars by our criteria, and they were all extremely poor even before the wars started.

[5]The results differ very little if we use *only* the income estimates from Penn World Tables 5.6 and "list-wise delete" the rest of the observations. The estimated impact of per capita income drops slightly to .26 (though

Because civil war can negatively affect income, we use lagged income in all of the logit regressions for all but the first year of each country's time series. We use the contemporaneous estimate for the first year in order not to lose these years, which are important because 10 of the 110 civil war onsets occur at the "birth" of the independent state. This procedure seems justifiable given that income estimates do not move quickly year to year, and the one year impact of most civil wars on income appears not to be particularly large. We adopt the same procedure for other lagged variables, such as log of population.

The State do-file used to produce the income estimates is available from the authors by request.

Population. For the country years for which it is available, we used the Penn World Tables 5.6 numbers.[6] Otherwise, we used the World Bank estimate (WDI 2001), and then the figure from the Correlates of War National Capabilities Data when neither the World Bank nor PWT provided an estimate. This means that population in years after 1992 are mainly World Bank estimates, while before 1950 everything is from COW. The correlation between these three different sources is nearly perfect, however, so it matters not all which source is used as the "base."[7]

Inspecting the annual growth rates implied by these figures revealed that transition years between series were more likely than other years to be unusually large or small (thus indicating different calculation or estimation methods rather than true population growth or decline). We took account of this when examining the impact of population growth on civil war onset; in Table 10, we include regressions that use only the observations where population growth is between the 2nd and 98th percentiles.

Percent Mountainous Terrain. As noted in the published article, this variable is based on work by geographer A.J. Gerard for the World Bank's "Economics of Civil War, Crime, and Violence" project. Our data includes twenty-two countries that were not included in the World Bank study for which Gerard produced the estimates (mainly former Soviet Republics). We estimated these missing values by making use of the difference (in meters) between the highest and lowest elevation points in each country, as given in the CIA Factbook. A graph of the log of Gerard's "percent mountainous" measure (plus one) against the log of the difference between the high and low elevation points is shown in Figure 1 for the 139 countries with common observations. From the figure, it is clear that the two measures are well correlated above a (hypothetical) threshold value for log(elevation difference). Be-

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it is still strongly significant), and the estimates for (dichotomous, lagged) anocracy and democracy become less precise, but otherwise very little changes.

[6]Excepting Pakistan 1947-71, where PWT gives the figure only for West Pakistan, as does the World Bank. We used the COW number for these country years, which has it right.

[7]The correlations are: PWT/WB, .995; PWT/COW, .999; COW/WB, .995.

low this Gerard was likely to consider a country not "mountainous" at all. Above 6.5 in log(elevation difference), for instance, the correlation is .79. We set "missing" countries to zero when the log(elevation difference) is less than 6.5; for the rest, we used the predicted values of the regression of log(% mountainous + 1) on log(elevation difference), omitting the less-than-6.5 cases. Using Tobit and assuming "censoring" at zero to estimate the slope and cutoff yields very similar results.

Gerard's measure is superior to the one based on elevation difference because it takes better account of local variability of terrain.

Noncontiguous States. Our coding criteria for this variable are given in footnote 20 of the published article. The following 25 countries are coded as noncontiguous for analyses omitting the anticolonial wars: Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Denmark, Fiji, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan before 1972, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Spain, United Kingdom, USA, and Yemen. When the empires are included, Belgium is coded as noncontiguous until 1962.

Oil Exporters. We used World Bank (WDI) data on fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports, which is available for five year periods from 1960 and annually from 1980 for most countries. Missing years prior to 1980 and after 1960 were linearly interpolated where possible.[8] We next created a dummy variable marking country years that had greater than 33% fuel exports. This dichotomous variable was then extended forward for each country for the most recent years if these lacked data, and backwards for missing years prior to 1960, on the assumption once countries come "on line" for oil production they generally stay there (this assumption was checked to a significant extent by going through the data and making country-specific inquires where we had doubts or concerns). Finally, we did country-specific research for a few countries with missing data in WDI, coding Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Libya, and Turkmenistan as "oil producers" since 1945 or since their first year of independence, and Russia as having reached the threshold in 1975 (based on information from Inna Sayfer, personal communication).

New States, Instability, Anocracy, Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization. As described in the published paper.

Religious Fractionalization. R. Quinn Mecham started with the CIA Factbook estimates and then used a number of other sources to construct a list of religions by country, and percentage of adherents. Figures are generally for the 1990s, though with few exceptions this variable does not seem to change much over time.

[8]We corrected apparent data entry errors for Benin (1983), Chad (1983), and Papua New Guinea (1993).

3 Multiple imputation of missing data

As noted above, the missing data on per capita income for 227 country years includes five years in which civil wars started. There are only 111 onsets in the data (omitting anticolonial wars), so this represents a small but not entirely trivial percentage. The method of multiple imputation (Rubin 1987) provides a way to check to see if their omission is materially affecting our estimates. Another concern that multiple imputation can address is that one of the methods we used to impute values for missing per capita income – using the predicted value from a regression using log(per capita energy consumption) as a covariate – does not take into account the uncertainty attached to these estimates. With multiple imputation, one draws several values from the distribution implied by the model that "predicts" missing values, and then combines them in a way that incorporates this uncertainty in the standard errors of the parameter estimates we are interested in.

Using Schafer's (1999) program for multiple imputation, we conducted a number of analyses, two of which are presented in Table 2 below. In Model 3 of that table, we simply take the data as we have it after estimating missing per income figures as described above. That is, there are $6610-6327 = 283$ country years that are missing either income, population, or democracy data, and for these the relevant values are multiply imputed. The imputation model contained all the variables in the "base model" (including onset), and, in addition, the log of per capita energy consumption, year, and dummies for all but one region.[9] The results were combined according to Rubin's rules, using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). In Model 4 of Table 2, we do the same thing, but treat as missing the values of per capita income that we had estimated using the energy consumption data (thus only country years with PWT or World Bank data are not missing).

Note that the estimation results are virtually identical. In most cases the standard errors actually shrink very slightly, reflecting the efficiency gains from using all the data.

4 Some notes on Tables 1 and 2 (alternative estimation methods)

Table 1 shows the results using several alternative estimation methods. Model 1 replicates the "base model" shown in Table 1, Model 1 of the published paper. Model 2 reports the

[9]Note that the covariates in this imputation model differ from the model used to generate predicted values described above. There, we in effect interact a dummy for each country with both log of per capita energy consumption and year (when there are at least 11 common observations), thus estimating country-specific effects for both growth rates and energy consumption. To replicate this model in the multiple imputation set up would require including hundreds of variables and, accordingly, the estimation of thousands of parameters. We have not hazarded this at this point.

results of a dynamic logit specification, where the dependent variable is now equal to '1' if there is a civil war occuring in the country year in question, and zero otherwise. Each independent variable is then interacted with the lagged dependent variable (Prior war), so that the effect of a variable "by itself" is its effect on the probability of a transition from the state of "no war" to war in a given year – that is, on civil war onset. These estimates are shown in the first column of Model 2. The second column reports the coefficients for the interaction of lagged war and the independent variables. The sum of the two coefficients for a variable is the effect of the variable on the probability that war *continues* into the current year given that it was already in progress in the last year. Hence the sum of the two coefficients can be interpreted as an estimate of the effect of the independent variable on civil war *duration*. Notice that (a) while higher income is estimated to strongly reduce the probability of onset, it is unrelated to civil war duration; (b) civil wars in large states tend to be somewhat longer as well as being more likely to occur; (c) more mountainous countries show little sign of having longer lasting civil wars when they get them; (d) civil wars in oil exporting states may actually be somewhat shorter on average; (e) change in governing arrangements in the course of a war (political instability) augurs the end of a civil war; (f) while ethnic diversity is unrelated to civil war onset, it is related to longer civil war duration.[10]

Model 3 in Table 1 gives the results of a Poisson regression, treating the dependent variable, civil war onset, as a count. In principle, more than civil war can begin in a given country year. In practice, this occurs in only country year in the data, in the Soviet Union in 1946, with independent rebellions in Ukraine and the three Baltic republics. In all logit estimations, we treat this year as "onset = 1." Here, with Poisson regression, we can allow "onset = 4." As shown, the results are nearly identical. Model 4 in Table 1 shows the (neglible) effects of using rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001). Model 5 controls for duration dependence by introducing natural cubic splines, as suggested by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998). (The splines are jointly insignificant in a likelihood ratio test.)

Table 2, Model 1 replicates the base line model 3 of Table 1 in the published paper. Model 2 continues the examination of possible duration dependence by estimating the model with the Cox proportional hazards method (the data is treated as duration data with time-varying covariates).[11] Models 3 and 4 are logit regressions on the "complete data sets" generated by multiple imputation; see the discussion above.

[10]For a more complete analysis of determinants of civil war duration, see Fearon (2001). See Jackman (2001) for a discussion of dynamic logit.

[11]This model was estimated performed using the statistical package R.

Appendix: List of civil wars

	Country	War years	Case name
	Western Europe		
1	BELGIUM	1956-61	Rwandan revolution
2	FRANCE	1945-54	Vietnam
3	FRANCE	1947-48	Madagascar
4	FRANCE	1952-54	Tunisia
5	FRANCE	1953-56	Morocco
6	FRANCE	1954-61	Algeria
7	FRANCE	1955-60	Cameroon
8	GREECE	1945-49	DSE
9	NETHERLANDS	1945-46	IPA
10	PORTUGAL	1961-75	Angola
11	PORTUGAL	1962-74	Guinea-Bissau
12	PORTUGAL	1964-74	Mozambique
13	UK	1950-56	CPM (Emergency)
14	UK	1952-56	Mau Mau
15	UK	1969-99	IRA
	Eastern Europe		
16	AZERBAIJAN	1992-94	Nagorno-Karabagh
17	BOSNIA	1992-95	Rep. Srpska/Croats
18	CROATIA	1992-95	Krajina
19	GEORGIA	1992-94	Abkhazia
20	MOLDOVA	1992-92	Dniestr Rep.
21	RUSSIA	1946-48	Lithuania/BDPS
22	RUSSIA	1946-50	Ukraine/UPA
23	RUSSIA	1946-47	Latvia/LTSPA, etc.
24	RUSSIA	1946-48	Estonia/Forest Brthers
25	RUSSIA	1994-96	Chechnya
26	RUSSIA	1999-	Chechnya II
27	TAJIKISTAN	1992-97	UTO
28	YUGOSLAVIA	1991-91	Croatia/Krajina
	Asia		
29	AFGHANISTAN	1978-92	Mujahideen
30	AFGHANISTAN	1992-	v. Taliban
31	BANGLADESH	1976-97	Chittagong Hills/Shanti Bahini
32	BURMA	1948-	CPB, Karens, etc.
33	CAMBODIA	1970-75	FUNK
34	CAMBODIA	1978-92	Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, etc
35	CHINA	1946-50	PLA

36	CHINA	1950-51	Tibet
37	CHINA	1956-59	Tibet
38	CHINA	1991-	Xinjiang
39	INDIA	1952-	N.East rebels
40	INDIA	1982-93	Sikhs
41	INDIA	1989-	Kashmir
42	INDONESIA	1950-50	Rep. S. Moluccas
43	INDONESIA	1953-53	Darul Islam
44	INDONESIA	1958-60	Darul Islam, PRRI, Permesta
45	INDONESIA	1965-	OPM (West Papua)
46	INDONESIA	1975-99	E. Timor
47	INDONESIA	1991-	GAM (Aceh)
48	KOREA, S.	1949-50	v. Rhee
49	LAOS	1960-73	Pathet Lao
50	NEPAL	1997-	CPN-M/UPF (Maoists)
51	PAKISTAN	1971-71	Bangladesh
52	PAKISTAN	1973-77	Baluchistan
53	PAKISTAN	1993-99	MQM:Sindhis v. Mohajirs
54	PAPUA N.G.	1988-98	BRA (Bougainville)
55	PHILIPPINES	1946-52	Huks
56	PHILIPPINES	1968-	MNLF, MILF
57	PHILIPPINES	1972-94	NPA
58	SRI LANKA	1971-71	JVP
59	SRI LANKA	1983-	LTTE, etc.
60	SRI LANKA	1987-89	JVP II
61	VIETNAM, S.	1960-75	NLF

North Africa/Middle East

62	ALGERIA	1962-63	Kabylie
63	ALGERIA	1992-	FIS
64	CYPRUS	1974-74	Cypriots, Turkey
65	IRAN	1978-79	Khomeini
66	IRAN	1979-93	KDPI (Kurds)
67	IRAQ	1959-59	Shammar
68	IRAQ	1961-74	KDP, PUK (Kurds)
69	JORDAN	1970-70	Fedeyeen/Syria v. govt
70	LEBANON	1958-58	Nasserites v. Chamoun
71	LEBANON	1975-90	various militias
72	MOROCCO	1975-88	Polisario
73	TURKEY	1977-80	Militia-ized party politics
74	TURKEY	1984-99	PKK
75	YEMEN	1994-94	South Yemen
76	YEMEN ARAB REP.	1948-48	Opp. coalition
77	YEMEN ARAB REP.	1962-69	Royalists
78	YEMEN PEOP. REP.	1986-87	Faction of Socialist Party

Sub-Saharan Africa

79	ANGOLA	1975-	UNITA
80	ANGOLA	1992-	FLEC (Cabinda)
81	BURUNDI	1972-72	Hutu uprising
82	BURUNDI	1988-88	Org. massacres on both sides
83	BURUNDI	1993-	Hutu groups v. govt
84	CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.	1996-97	Factional fighting
85	CHAD	1965-	FROLINAT, various ...
86	CHAD	1994-98	Rebels in South
87	CONGO	1998-99	Factional fighting
88	DEM. REP. CONGO	1960-65	Katanga, Kasai, CNL
89	DEM. REP. CONGO	1977-78	FLNC
90	DEM. REP. CONGO	1996-97	AFDL (Kabila)
91	DEM. REP. CONGO	1998-	RCD, etc v. govt
92	DJIBOUTI	1993-94	FRUD
93	ETHIOPIA	1974-92	Eritrea, Tigray, etc.
94	ETHIOPIA	1997-	ALF, ARDUF (Afars)
95	GUINEA BISSAU	1998-99	Mil. faction
96	LIBERIA	1989-96	NPFL (Taylor), INPFL (Johnson)
97	MALI	1989-94	Tuaregs
98	MOZAMBIQUE	1976-95	RENAMO
99	NIGERIA	1967-70	Biafra
100	RWANDA	1962-65	Post-rev strife
101	RWANDA	1990-	RPF, genocide
102	SENEGAL	1989-	MFDC (Casamance)
103	SIERRA LEONE	1991-	RUF, AFRC, etc.
104	SOMALIA	1981-91	SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs)
105	SOMALIA	1991-	post-Barre war
106	SOUTH AFRICA	1983-94	ANC, PAC, Azapo
107	SUDAN	1963-72	Anya Nya
108	SUDAN	1983-	SPLA, etc.
109	UGANDA	1981-87	NRA, etc.
110	UGANDA	1993-	LRA, West Nile, etc.
111	ZIMBABWE	1972-79	ZANU, ZAPU
112	ZIMBABWE	1983-87	Ndebele guer's

Latin America and the Caribbean

113	ARGENTINA	1955-55	Mil. coup
114	ARGENTINA	1973-77	ERP/Montoneros
115	BOLIVIA	1952-52	MNR
116	COLOMBIA	1948-62	La Violencia
117	COLOMBIA	1963-	FARC, ELN, etc
118	COSTARICA	1948-48	NLA
119	CUBA	1958-59	Castro
120	DOMINICAN REP.	1965-65	Mil. coup
121	EL SALVADOR	1979-92	FMLN

122	GUATEMALA	1968-96	URNG, various
123	HAITI	1991-95	Mil. coup
124	NICARAGUA	1978-79	FSLN
125	NICARAGUA	1981-88	Contras
126	PARAGUAY	1947-47	Febreristas, Libs, Comms
127	PERU	1981-95	Sendero Luminoso

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Table 1: Different Estimation Methods

	(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)	(5)
	Base model	Dynamic logit		Poisson	RElogit	Splines
Dep. Var.	onset		war	onset	onset	onset
		Effect on onset	Interaction with lagged war			
Prior War	-0.954**		6.641**	-0.978**	-0.921**	-0.935**
	(0.314)		(1.498)	(0.306)	(0.314)	(0.326)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.344**	-0.362**	0.472**	-0.321**	-0.334**	-0.351**
	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.131)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.075)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.263**	0.253**	-0.056	0.268**	0.263**	0.260**
	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.143)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.073)
log(%Mountains)	0.219**	0.228**	-0.186	0.207*	0.215**	0.220**
	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.145)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.085)
Non-contiguous State	0.443	0.433	0.220	0.538*	0.447	0.463
	(0.274)	(0.306)	(0.520)	(0.257)	(0.254)	(0.282)
Oil	0.858**	0.850**	-1.962**	0.715**	0.864**	0.855**
	(0.279)	(0.307)	(0.547)	(0.269)	(0.257)	(0.281)
New State	1.709**	1.755**		1.543**	1.729**	1.729**
	(0.339)	(0.341)		(0.319)	(0.342)	(0.375)
Political Instability	0.618**	0.607*	-1.318**	0.570*	0.624**	0.613**
	(0.235)	(0.260)	(0.385)	(0.228)	(0.233)	(0.236)
Democracy (Polity 4)[a]	0.021	0.027	-0.041	0.012	0.021	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.166	0.111	1.204	0.218	0.155	0.156
	(0.373)	(0.398)	(0.659)	(0.360)	(0.366)	(0.375)
Relig. Fractionalization	0.285	0.343	-0.444	0.299	0.302	0.282
	(0.509)	(0.542)	(0.883)	(0.492)	(0.533)	(0.512)
spline1						0.000
						(0.000)
spline2						-0.000
						(0.000)
spline3						0.000
						(0.000)
Constant	-6.731**	-6.616**		-6.817**	-6.699**	-6.718**
	(0.736)	(0.784)		(0.710)	(0.747)	(0.742)
Observations	6327	6327		6327	6327	6327

Note: In this all subsequent tables, standard errors are in parentheses; ** means that $p < .01$, and * means that $p < .05$; unless otherwise noted, estimations are logit regressions performed using Stata 7.0.

[a] Varies from -10 to 10. As per the Polity 4 coders' suggestions, foreign occupation years are treated as missing, "regime interruptions" are coded as 0, and "transition period" years are interpolated. This is the case for all Democracy and Anocracy values in the following tables unless otherwise noted.

Table 2: More Estimation Methods, and Multiple Imputation

	(1) Base model	(2) Cox regression	(3) Logit, missing data multiply imputed[a]	(4) Logit, missing data multiply imputed[b]
Dep. Var.	onset	onset	onset	onset
Prior war	-0.916**	-.850**	-0.926**	-0.939**
	(0.312)	(.330)	(0.309)	(0.309)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.318**	-0.318**	-0.287	-0.303
	(0.071)	(.074)	(0.072)	(0.073)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.272**	0.257**	0.258**	0.257**
	(0.074)	(.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)
log(% Mountainous)	0.199*	0.192*	0.214*	0.212*
	(0.085)	(.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Noncontiguous	0.426	0.411	0.443	0.457
	(0.272)	(.271)	(0.268)	(0.267)
Oil Exporter	0.751**	0.714**	0.768**	0.798**
	(0.278)	(.273)	(0.272)	(0.274)
New State	1.658**	1.488**	1.625**	1.638**
	(0.342)	(.546)	(0.320)	(0.318)
Instability	0.513*	0.425	0.532*	0.527*
	(0.242)	(.241)	(0.239)	(0.239)
Anocracy[c]	0.521*	0.503*	0.507*	0.513*
	(0.237)	(.240)	(0.231)	(0.231)
Democracy[d]	0.127	0.129	0.036	0.038
	(0.304)	(.305)	(0.308)	(0.305)
Ethnic Frac.	0.164	0.132	0.162	0.084
	(0.368)	(.364)	(0.361)	(0.365)
Religious Frac.	0.326	0.132	0.482	0.522
	(0.506)	(.363)	(0.490)	(0.493)
Constant	-7.019**		-7.035**	-6.969**
	(0.751)		(0.735)	(0.737)
Observations	6327	6327	6610	6610

[a] Combined estimates for ten imputations using the data as it is in the base model. See text for details.
[b] Combined estimates for ten imputations using only Penn World Tables 5.6 and World Bank-based income estimates, the rest treated as missing.
[c] Dichotomous, Polity 4 measure $\in [-5, 5] = 1$.
[d] Dichotomous, Polity 4 measure $> 5 = 1$.

Table 3: More on GDP/cap and Cultural Diversity

	(1) onset	(2) onset (Asia, SSA, ME/NA only)	(3) onset	(4) onset	(5) onset
Prior War	-1.024**	-0.974**	-0.957**	-0.950**	-0.948**
	(0.318)	(0.335)	(0.315)	(0.315)	(0.313)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.285**	-0.296**	-0.344**	-0.351**	-0.353**
	(0.077)	(0.112)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.071)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.257**	0.273**	0.271**	0.265**	0.271**
	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.072)
log(%Mountains)	0.205*	0.216*	0.215*	0.209*	0.217*
	(0.085)	(0.096)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Non-contiguous State	0.642*	0.269	0.462	0.439	0.429
	(0.286)	(0.333)	(0.276)	(0.274)	(0.276)
Oil	0.730*	0.971**	0.833**	0.852**	0.859**
	(0.286)	(0.321)	(0.280)	(0.271)	(0.272)
New State	1.651**	1.282**	1.722**	1.735**	1.744**
	(0.339)	(0.404)	(0.338)	(0.337)	(0.337)
Political Instability	0.601*	0.426	0.622**	0.618**	0.626**
	(0.234)	(0.276)	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.236)
Democracy (Polity 4)	0.023	0.039	0.020	0.021	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ethnic Frac.	0.089	-0.031			
	(0.374)	(0.423)			
Relig. Frac.	0.191	0.306			
	(0.516)	(0.576)			
"Western"[a]	-1.517				
	(0.791)				
Share of Largest Eth. Grp.[b]			-0.267		
			(0.453)		
Share of Largest Relig. Grp.[b]			-0.002		
			(0.006)		
log(# languages)				0.027	
				(0.115)	
Ethnic Polarization[c]					-0.087
					(0.214)
Relig. Polarization[c]					-0.291
					(0.743)
Constant	-6.611**	-6.537**	-6.340**	-6.582**	-6.286**
	(0.736)	(0.874)	(0.787)	(0.707)	(0.974)
Observations	6327	3424	6327	6327	6327

[a] Dummy marking countries in the "West," based on the region codings in the Minorities at Risk data set (as are all region codings here). Japan is included.
[b] Varies from 0 to 1.
[c] Dummy marking countries with 50% or greater ethnic (religious) majority and at least an 8% ethnic (religious) minority.

Table 4: Even more on GDP/cap and Cultural Diversity

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset	(4) onset
Prior War	-0.951**	-0.954**	-0.952**	-0.951**
	(0.314)	(0.314)	(0.313)	(0.314)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.270	-0.508**	-0.349**	-0.348**
	(0.175)	(0.135)	(0.071)	(0.073)
Per Capita Income^2 (lagged)	-0.010			
	(0.022)			
log(Population) (lagged)	0.264**	0.263**	0.267**	0.267**
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.074)
log(%Mountains)	0.220**	0.201*	0.217*	0.213*
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)
Non-contiguous State	0.447	0.476	0.443	0.447
	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.274)	(0.274)
Oil	0.843**	0.820**	0.854**	0.859**
	(0.281)	(0.280)	(0.271)	(0.279)
New State	1.717**	1.705**	1.722**	1.705**
	(0.338)	(0.337)	(0.338)	(0.339)
Political Instability	0.621**	0.624**	0.617**	0.614**
	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.235)
Democracy (Polity 4)	0.020	0.022	0.021	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ethnic Frac.	0.184	-0.413		0.573
	(0.375)	(0.519)		(1.503)
Relig. Frac.	0.326	0.226		0.317
	(0.516)	(0.508)		(0.521)
Per Capita Income (lagged)$*$Ethnic Frac.		0.413		
		(0.257)		
Ethnic Frac.$*$Relig. Frac.			0.344	
			(0.573)	
Ethnic Frac.^{2}				-0.479
				(1.713)
Constant	-6.843**	-6.399**	-6.640**	-6.804**
	(0.775)	(0.758)	(0.718)	(0.780)
Observations	6327	6327	6327	6327

Table 5: Onset of "Ethnic War"

	(1) ethonset[a]	(2) ethonset[a]	(3) ethonset[a,b]
Prior War	-0.880*	-0.958*	-1.052*
	(0.393)	(0.400)	(0.489)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.354**	-0.325**	-0.348**
	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.106)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.383**	0.354**	0.477**
	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.135)
log(%Mountains)	0.122	0.120	0.213
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.130)
Non-contiguous State	0.555	0.352	0.525
	(0.401)	(0.420)	(0.473)
Oil	0.702*	0.698*	0.548
	(0.350)	(0.345)	(0.456)
New State	1.792**	1.838**	1.248*
	(0.415)	(0.415)	(0.574)
Political Instability	0.412	0.411	0.146
	(0.316)	(0.315)	(0.392)
Democracy (Polity 4)	0.014	0.012	0.007
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Share Largest Eth. Group	-0.851		
	(0.767)		
Share Largest Relig. Grp.	-0.011		
	(0.008)		
log(# languages)		0.295	
		(0.167)	
Ethnic Frac.			-0.581
			(0.664)
Relig. Frac.			1.909*
			(0.870)
Constant	-6.519**	-8.043**	-9.568**
	(1.094)	(1.068)	(1.368)
Observations	5186	5186	5186

[a] Only countries with a greater-than-5% ethnic minority.
[b] Mixed and ambiguous cases of "ethnic war" excluded.

Table 6: More on Democracy and Civil Liberties

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset
Prior War	-0.817	-1.097**	-0.910**
	(0.435)	(0.401)	(0.313)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.255**	-0.312**	-0.319**
	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.071)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.319**	0.285**	0.266**
	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.073)
log(%Mountains)	0.238*	0.241*	0.206*
	(0.116)	(0.102)	(0.085)
Non-contiguous State	0.196	0.526	0.453
	(0.372)	(0.427)	(0.272)
Oil	0.692	0.369	0.770**
	(0.389)	(0.358)	(0.278)
New State	1.926**	2.384**	1.690**
	(0.526)	(0.500)	(0.341)
Political Instability	0.391	0.730*	0.568*
	(0.348)	(0.298)	(0.241)
Ethnic Frac.	0.542	0.740	0.173
	(0.533)	(0.517)	(0.370)
Relig. Frac.	-0.104	-0.366	0.308
	(0.710)	(0.678)	(0.507)
Democracy[a]	0.066		
	(0.350)		
Civil Liberties[b]		0.026	
		(0.104)	
Anocracy (lagged)[c]			0.345
			(0.238)
Democracy(lagged)[c]			0.108
			(0.297)
Constant	-7.574**	-6.997**	-6.934**
	(0.984)	(1.084)	(0.746)
Observations	3869	3675	6328

[a] Dichotomous measure from Przeworski et al. 2000; '1' = democracy.

[b] Freedom House, varies from 1 to 7, with higher values meaning fewer civil liberties.

[c] Based on Polity 4, but interpolating "regime interuption" years (-77) rather than setting these to 0, to avoid attributing to anocracy an effect that should be attributed to political instability.

Table 7: Language Discrimination and Civil War Onset

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset
Prior War	-0.915**	-0.996**	-0.979**
	(0.312)	(0.318)	(0.348)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.318**	-0.320**	-0.300**
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.075)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.272**	0.252**	0.278**
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.093)
log(%Mountains)	0.198*	0.218*	0.165
	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Non-contiguous State	0.424	0.414	0.423
	(0.272)	(0.274)	(0.354)
Oil	0.751**	0.718*	0.513
	(0.278)	(0.281)	(0.309)
New State	1.656**	1.682**	1.595**
	(0.343)	(0.343)	(0.383)
Political Instability	0.512*	0.535*	0.500
	(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.262)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.523*	0.485*	0.403
	(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.255)
Democracy (lagged)	0.127	0.094	0.040
	(0.304)	(0.305)	(0.320)
Ethnic Frac.	0.147	0.433	0.098
	(0.468)	(0.399)	(0.474)
Relig. Frac.	0.333	0.189	0.236
	(0.522)	(0.511)	(0.578)
Language Discrimination (Center)[a]	0.015		
	(0.266)		
Language Discrimination (Region)[b]		-0.396	-0.471
		(0.233)	(0.241)
Constant	-7.024**	-6.766**	-6.614**
	(0.759)	(0.759)	(0.897)
Observations	6326	6326	5186[c]

[a] Is there a speech community with at least 5% of the population that is not permitted or authorized at the state's center and is not in fact used in any official forum at the center such as in government institutions or government media?

[b] Is there a speech community with at least 5% of the population that is not permitted or authorized at the regional level and is not in fact used in any official forum, such as in primary schools, regional media, or district council meetings?

[c] Countries with a greater-than-5% ethnic minority only.

Table 8: Religious Discrimination and Civil War Onset

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset	(4) onset	(5) onset	(6) onset
Prior War	-0.852**	-0.873**	-0.876**	-0.866**	-0.886**	-0.750*
	(0.312)	(0.316)	(0.313)	(0.314)	(0.328)	(0.306)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.309**	-0.310**	-0.309**	-0.303**	-0.288**	-0.293**
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.067)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.273**	0.274**	0.252**	0.252**	0.242**	0.314**
	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.072)
log(%Mountains)	0.203*	0.169	0.218*	0.150	0.123	0.140
	(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.091)
Non-contiguous State	0.406	0.359	0.426	0.383	0.427	
	(0.273)	(0.282)	(0.274)	(0.281)	(0.296)	
Oil	0.771**	0.720*	0.762**	0.682*	0.651*	0.674*
	(0.278)	(0.288)	(0.280)	(0.287)	(0.308)	(0.278)
New State	1.724**	1.698**	1.699**	1.689**	1.416**	1.840**
	(0.345)	(0.357)	(0.346)	(0.358)	(0.404)	(0.349)
Political Instability	0.459	0.526*	0.478	0.498*	0.538*	0.531*
	(0.247)	(0.252)	(0.246)	(0.253)	(0.264)	(0.250)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.519*	0.503*	0.539*	0.570*	0.706**	0.500*
	(0.240)	(0.253)	(0.242)	(0.253)	(0.271)	(0.224)
Democracy (lagged)	0.168	0.208	0.176	0.337	0.434	
	(0.306)	(0.323)	(0.309)	(0.324)	(0.344)	
Ethnic Frac.	0.188	0.265	0.208	0.356	0.381	
	(0.374)	(0.401)	(0.376)	(0.401)	(0.414)	
Relig. Frac.	0.564	0.178	0.356	0.318	0.251	
	(0.524)	(0.520)	(0.509)	(0.526)	(0.610)	
State Religion[a]	0.318					
	(0.231)					
Free Practice[b]		-0.021				
		(0.245)				
Relig. Discrim.[c]			0.126			
			(0.241)			
Common Factor[d]				0.184	0.223	0.084
				(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.124)
Constant	-7.260**	-6.932**	-6.975**	-6.856**	-6.753**	-7.014**
	(0.781)	(0.820)	(0.766)	(0.781)	(0.851)	(0.710)
Observations	6085	5718	6131	5654	4705[e]	5654

[a] State has an official religion (coded by decade).
[b] State allows free practice of religion (coded by decade).
[c] State practices or allows harrasment of a minority religion(s) (coded by decade).
[d] Common factor based on six dichotomous indicators of religious discrimination.
[e] Countries with a greater-than-5% ethnic minority only.

Table 9: Inequality, Democratization, Exclusion of Insignificant IVs

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset	(4) onset	(5) onset
Prior War	-1.005*	-1.022*	-0.770*	-0.753*	-0.814**
	(0.409)	(0.409)	(0.381)	(0.322)	(0.303)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.339**	-0.340**	-0.304**	-0.334**	-0.310**
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.067)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.362**	0.377**	0.420**	0.276**	0.318**
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.091)	(0.073)	(0.068)
log(%Mountains)	0.162	0.162	0.156	0.188*	0.186*
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.089)	(0.082)
Non-contiguous State	0.550	0.576			
	(0.336)	(0.331)			
Oil	0.759*	0.765*	0.777*	0.730*	0.754**
	(0.359)	(0.358)	(0.332)	(0.294)	(0.266)
New State	1.465**	1.480**	1.628**		1.768**
	(0.494)	(0.495)	(0.479)		(0.333)
Political Instability	0.478	0.486	0.491		0.518*
	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.297)		(0.241)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.675*	0.645*	0.615*	0.635*	0.518*
	(0.314)	(0.316)	(0.267)	(0.252)	(0.213)
Democracy (lagged)	0.397	0.371		0.363	
	(0.371)	(0.373)		(0.324)	
Ethnic Frac.	0.370	0.344			
	(0.486)	(0.488)			
Relig. Frac.	-0.179	-0.177			
	(0.684)	(0.687)			
Gini[a]	0.005				
	(0.015)				
Country Avg. Gini[b]		0.012	0.008		
		(0.015)	(0.014)		
Autocratization[c]				0.401	
				(0.366)	
Democratization[d]				-0.026	
				(0.356)	
Constant	-8.280**	-8.661**	-8.686**	-6.763**	-7.162**
	(1.319)	(1.353)	(1.270)	(0.724)	(0.682)
Observations	4615	4615	4615	6065	6327

[a] Interpolated and extended Gini coefficients based on Deininger and Squire (1996).
[b] Average of Gini coefficients for the country.
[c] Greater-than-2 autocratic change in Polity IV index in one of years $t-1$ to $t-4$.
[d] Greater-than-2 democratic change in Polity IV index in one of years $t-1$ to $t-4$.

Table 10: Population Growth Rates[a]

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset
Prior War	-0.795*	-0.849*	-0.774*
	(0.315)	(0.336)	(0.327)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.314**	-0.315**	-0.305**
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.072)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.256**	0.258**	0.279**
	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.074)
log(%Mountains)	0.186*	0.188*	0.163
	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.089)
Non-contiguous State	0.265	0.097	
	(0.305)	(0.327)	
Oil	0.701*	0.651*	0.584
	(0.301)	(0.317)	(0.306)
Political Instability	0.567*	0.498	0.525*
	(0.246)	(0.256)	(0.253)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.519*	0.564*	0.446
	(0.254)	(0.263)	(0.238)
Democracy (lagged)	0.239	0.384	
	(0.322)	(0.326)	
Ethnic Frac.	0.131	0.168	
	(0.393)	(0.402)	
Relig. Frac.	0.585	0.628	
	(0.544)	(0.560)	
Population growth rate[b]	0.015	0.024	0.024
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Constant	-6.977**	-7.052**	-6.765**
	(0.793)	(0.813)	(0.736)
Observations	6092	5856[c]	5856[c]

[a] Note that New State is dropped in these models, as it is not reasonable to impute the first two observations for population growth for each country by using the unlagged values.

[b] Percent growth rate from year $t-2$ to year $t-1$.

[c] Dropping country years in which pop. growth rate is above the 98th or below the 2nd percentile (to reduce influence of some extreme observations).

Table 11: Muslims, Young Males

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset	(4) onset
Prior War	-0.900**	-0.893**	-1.007**	-0.983**
	(0.311)	(0.338)	(0.320)	(0.317)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.307**	-0.250**	-0.247**	-0.254**
	(0.072)	(0.087)	(0.075)	(0.070)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.267**	0.282**	0.323**	0.330**
	(0.075)	(0.087)	(0.077)	(0.075)
log(%Mountains)	0.200*	0.190*	0.192*	0.180*
	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.084)
Non-contiguous State	0.426	0.443	0.575*	0.596*
	(0.272)	(0.340)	(0.285)	(0.279)
Oil	0.664*	0.405	0.542	0.537
	(0.292)	(0.340)	(0.292)	(0.278)
New State	1.615**	1.913**	1.750**	1.789**
	(0.345)	(0.449)	(0.347)	(0.342)
Political Instability	0.497*	0.587*	0.502*	0.512*
	(0.243)	(0.275)	(0.247)	(0.245)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.531*	0.619*	0.511*	0.475*
	(0.237)	(0.278)	(0.244)	(0.219)
Democracy (lagged)	0.150	0.103	0.095	
	(0.306)	(0.353)	(0.311)	
Ethnic Frac.	0.132	0.437	0.233	
	(0.370)	(0.446)	(0.374)	
Relig. Frac.	0.429	0.083	0.173	
	(0.514)	(0.578)	(0.517)	
% Muslim	0.003			
	(0.003)			
Proportion Male 15-24[a]		5.112		
		(3.793)		
Proportion Male 15-24, ext.[b]			6.784*	6.985*
			(3.213)	(3.208)
Constant	-7.093**	-8.204**	-8.947**	-8.823**
	(0.757)	(1.317)	(1.134)	(1.122)
Observations	6327	4831	6166	6166

[a] Interpolated using World Bank data.
[b] Interpolated and extended forward and backward using the first and last observation for each country.

Table 12: Male Secondary School Enrollment

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset
Prior War	-0.788*	-0.867**	-0.763*
	(0.382)	(0.314)	(0.305)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.215*	-0.268**	-0.262**
	(0.096)	(0.082)	(0.078)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.333**	0.303**	0.348**
	(0.100)	(0.078)	(0.073)
log(%Mountains)	0.254*	0.176*	0.163*
	(0.105)	(0.085)	(0.082)
Non-contiguous State	0.263	0.416	
	(0.380)	(0.275)	
Oil	0.335	0.702*	0.700*
	(0.396)	(0.286)	(0.273)
New State	2.037**	1.700**	1.816**
	(0.490)	(0.345)	(0.336)
Political Instability	0.333	0.492*	0.492*
	(0.318)	(0.248)	(0.246)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.682*	0.547*	0.543*
	(0.307)	(0.243)	(0.217)
Democracy (lagged)	0.145	0.125	
	(0.396)	(0.310)	
Ethnic Frac.	0.208	0.166	
	(0.508)	(0.390)	
Relig. Frac.	0.035	0.401	
	(0.645)	(0.525)	
Secondary School Enrollment (male, % of total)[a]	-0.006		
	(0.007)		
Secondary School Enrollment (male, % of total)[b]		-0.004	-0.004
		(0.006)	(0.005)
Constant	-7.569**	-7.256**	-7.359**
	(0.974)	(0.767)	(0.701)
Observations	4186	6104	6104

[a] Interpolated using World Bank data.
[b] Interpolated and extended forward and backward using earliest and latest measured values.

Table 13: Neighboring civil wars and French support to SSA

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset	(4) onset
Prior War	-0.930**	-0.920**	-0.920**	-0.913**
	(0.312)	(0.312)	(0.312)	(0.312)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.321**	-0.318**	-0.322**	-0.320**
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.234**	0.256**	0.252**	0.267**
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.075)
log(%Mountains)	0.185*	0.193*	0.160	0.193*
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.086)
Non-contiguous State	0.516	0.462	0.420	0.414
	(0.279)	(0.280)	(0.271)	(0.273)
Oil	0.772**	0.759**	0.707*	0.755**
	(0.279)	(0.279)	(0.280)	(0.279)
New State	1.665**	1.672**	1.705**	1.662**
	(0.342)	(0.343)	(0.344)	(0.342)
Political Instability	0.478	0.499*	0.493*	0.513*
	(0.245)	(0.244)	(0.242)	(0.242)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.502*	0.514*	0.475*	0.516*
	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.237)
Democracy (lagged)	0.102	0.114	0.043	0.115
	(0.305)	(0.305)	(0.306)	(0.306)
Ethnic Frac.	0.102	0.141	0.251	0.162
	(0.371)	(0.371)	(0.373)	(0.368)
Relig. Frac.	0.254	0.298	0.314	0.319
	(0.507)	(0.508)	(0.510)	(0.508)
# Civ. wars ongoing in contiguous states	0.113			
	(0.083)			
# Civ. wars ongoing in contiguous states[a]		0.047		
		(0.090)		
French colony & S.S. Africa & pre-1990			-0.999	
			(0.622)	
French colony				-0.100
				(0.293)
Constant	-6.674**	-6.881**	-6.665**	-6.929**
	(0.782)	(0.790)	(0.772)	(0.793)
Observations	6327	6327	6327	6327

[a] Lagged. The coefficient falls vs. the result in Model (1) because there the variable picks up the war-causing effects of some simultaneous shocks to several states, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Table 14: More with anticolonial wars included

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset
Prior War	-0.529*	-0.660*	-0.615*
	(0.257)	(0.267)	(0.265)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.269**	-0.305**	-0.293**
	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.068)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.348**	0.259**	0.275**
	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.072)
log(%Mountains)	0.194*	0.185*	0.162*
	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Oil	0.576*	0.490	0.431
	(0.262)	(0.274)	(0.273)
New State	1.640**	1.640**	1.562**
	(0.326)	(0.335)	(0.339)
Political Instability	0.531*	0.571*	0.406
	(0.224)	(0.228)	(0.235)
Ethnic Frac.	0.625	0.582	0.552
	(0.339)	(0.350)	(0.346)
Non-contiguous State		0.787**	0.685**
		(0.249)	(0.249)
"Democracy" [a,b]		0.002	
		(0.016)	
"Anocracy" [a,c]			0.567*
			(0.222)
"Democracy" [a,d]			-0.043
			(0.300)
Constant	-7.570**	-6.739**	-6.971**
	(0.644)	(0.696)	(0.712)
Observations	6360	6192	6192

[a] Lagged.
[b] For empires, the population weighted average of the metropole's Polity IV democracy score and -10 (perfect autocracy).
[c] Using "Democracy" as in note b, '1' for regimes with a score from -5 to 5.
[d] Using "Democracy" as in note b, '1' for regimes with a score greater than five.

Table 15: Region dummies

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset	(4) onset	(5) onset	(6) onset
Prior War	-1.018**	-0.930**	-0.917**	-0.923**	-0.924**	-0.914**
	(3.22)	(0.312)	(0.312)	(0.312)	(0.312)	(0.312)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.229**	-0.306**	-0.314**	-0.320**	-0.308**	-0.317**
	(2.83)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.285**	0.276**	0.267**	0.275**	0.283**	0.270**
	(3.61)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.075)
log(%Mountains)	0.208*	0.198*	0.196*	0.190*	0.215*	0.200*
	(2.37)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Non-contiguous State	0.759*	0.428	0.408	0.484	0.468	0.417
	(2.35)	(0.271)	(0.285)	(0.278)	(0.279)	(0.276)
Oil	0.544	0.755**	0.761**	0.643*	0.755**	0.751**
	(1.79)	(0.278)	(0.283)	(0.297)	(0.278)	(0.278)
New State	1.599**	1.686**	1.656**	1.641**	1.653**	1.649**
	(4.59)	(0.344)	(0.342)	(0.343)	(0.342)	(0.345)
Political Instability	0.510*	0.518*	0.515*	0.511*	0.508*	0.512*
	(2.10)	(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.243)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.488*	0.500*	0.521*	0.517*	0.532*	0.529*
	(2.01)	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.238)	(0.241)
Democracy (lagged)	0.172	0.088	0.126	0.136	0.134	0.135
	(0.56)	(0.309)	(0.304)	(0.305)	(0.305)	(0.308)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.017	0.145	0.160	0.262	0.066	0.156
	(0.04)	(0.367)	(0.369)	(0.380)	(0.394)	(0.371)
Relig. Frac.	0.014	0.369	0.340	0.378	0.165	0.304
	(0.02)	(0.506)	(0.511)	(0.503)	(0.560)	(0.522)
E. Europe	1.286	-0.317				
	(1.47)	(0.387)				
Asia	1.607		0.057			
	(1.92)		(0.272)			
N. Africa/M. East	1.889*			0.351		
	(2.17)			(0.324)		
SubSaharan Africa	1.940*				0.213	
	(2.10)				(0.312)	
Latin America/Carib.	1.506					-0.055
	(1.79)					(0.326)
Constant	-8.769**	-7.041**	-6.986**	-7.128**	-7.159**	-6.986**
	(7.62)	(0.749)	(0.766)	(0.765)	(0.780)	(0.775)
Observations	6327	6327	6327	6327	6327	6327

Table 16: Period Effects and Conditional Fixed-Effects Logit

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset[a]	(4) onset[a]	(5) onset
Prior War	-1.092**	-1.066**	-2.494**	-2.506**	-1.083**
	(0.322)	(0.320)	(0.396)	(0.395)	(0.319)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.375**	-0.359**	-0.241		
	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.173)		
log(Per Capita Income (lagged))				-0.780*	-0.782**
				(0.333)	(0.138)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.268**	0.264**	-0.320	-0.332	0.256**
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.841)	(0.831)	(0.075)
log(%Mountains)	0.207*	0.204*			0.190*
	(0.083)	(0.083)			(0.083)
Non-contiguous State	0.603*	0.601*			0.590*
	(0.283)	(0.282)			(0.287)
Oil	0.694*	0.671*	0.569	0.647	0.678*
	(0.283)	(0.281)	(0.758)	(0.818)	(0.284)
New State	1.734**	1.722**	1.846**	1.912**	1.786**
	(0.356)	(0.351)	(0.436)	(0.435)	(0.350)
Political Instability	0.449	0.465	0.636*	0.557*	0.423
	(0.246)	(0.245)	(0.278)	(0.281)	(0.250)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.579*	0.487*	0.504	0.465	0.584*
	(0.248)	(0.239)	(0.291)	(0.293)	(0.241)
Democracy (lagged)	0.155	0.048	-0.375	-0.503	0.009
	(0.312)	(0.305)	(0.427)	(0.436)	(0.313)
Ethnic Frac.	0.087	0.085			0.070
	(0.373)	(0.374)			(0.372)
Relig. Frac.	0.072	0.107			-0.356
	(0.513)	(0.514)			(0.523)
Year		0.021**	0.045*	0.052*	0.020**
		(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.008)
40s		0.644			
		(0.439)			
50s	-0.640				
	(0.481)				
60s	-0.457				
	(0.448)				
70s	0.340				
	(0.440)				
80s	0.150				
	(0.468)				
90s	0.284				
	(0.441)				
Constant	-6.789**	-48.259**			-41.978**
Observations	6327	6327	2756	2756	6327
# of countries[b]			65	65	

[a] Estimated using conditional fixed-effects logit.
[b] Out of 74 in the sample with at least one civil war.

Table 17: Primary Commodity Exports and Trade Openness

	(1) onset	(2) onset	(3) onset	(4) onset	(5) onset
Prior War	-0.895**	-0.895**	-0.757*	-0.855*	-0.784
	(0.335)	(0.335)	(0.320)	(0.333)	(0.428)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.323**	-0.323**	-0.320**	-0.293**	-0.258**
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.087)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.190*	0.190*	0.255**	0.247**	0.313**
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.114)
log(%Mountains)	0.197*	0.197*	0.172	0.188	0.229
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.119)
Non-contiguous State	0.480	0.480		0.494	0.116
	(0.343)	(0.343)		(0.343)	(0.373)
Oil	0.831*	0.831*	0.747*		0.840*
	(0.378)	(0.378)	(0.367)		(0.376)
New State	1.228	1.228	1.418*	1.239	1.562**
	(0.638)	(0.638)	(0.631)	(0.637)	(0.526)
Political Instability	0.543*	0.543*	0.567*	0.579*	0.282
	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.271)	(0.274)	(0.351)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.539	0.539	0.490	0.503	0.549
	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.256)	(0.284)	(0.327)
Democracy (lagged)	0.226	0.226		0.098	0.221
	(0.346)	(0.346)		(0.343)	(0.394)
Ethnic Frac.	0.403	0.403		0.428	0.550
	(0.451)	(0.451)		(0.450)	(0.524)
Relig. Frac.	0.510	0.510		0.314	-0.026
	(0.588)	(0.588)		(0.574)	(0.710)
Primary Commod. Exports[a]	0.954	0.954	1.525	3.094	
	(3.714)	(3.714)	(3.557)	(3.594)	
(Pri. Commod. Exports)^2	-6.185	-6.185	-5.914	-8.266	
	(8.003)	(8.003)	(7.581)	(7.981)	
(Exports+Imports)*100/GDP					-0.001
					(0.006)
Constant	-6.294**	-6.294**	-6.424**	-6.893**	-7.710**
	(1.063)	(1.063)	(1.016)	(1.048)	(1.327)
Observations	4772	4772	4772	4772	4206

[a] As a proportion of total exports. The data (from the World Bank) is available for 1960, 1965, and so on, to 1995. We interpolated values within this range and extended the 1995 value through 1999 for each country.

Table 18: Other codings of "civil war"

	(1)	(2)
	onset	onset
	Doyle and Sambanis (2000)	Collier and Hoeffler (2001)
Prior War	-0.812*	-0.857*
	(0.322)	(0.422)
Per Capita Income (lagged)	-0.289**	-0.280**
	(0.065)	(0.081)
log(Population) (lagged)	0.170*	0.185*
	(0.070)	(0.086)
log(%Mountains)	0.234**	0.350**
	(0.080)	(0.102)
Non-contiguous State	0.158	0.138
	(0.275)	(0.357)
Oil	0.869**	1.166**
	(0.270)	(0.322)
New State	1.625**	1.848**
	(0.326)	(0.407)
Political Instability	0.605**	0.412
	(0.234)	(0.314)
Anocracy (lagged)	0.525*	0.435
	(0.230)	(0.287)
Democracy (lagged)	0.260	-0.059
	(0.283)	(0.369)
Ethnic Frac.	-0.082	0.016
	(0.351)	(0.449)
Relig. Frac.	0.909	0.752
	(0.482)	(0.607)
Constant	-6.277**	-6.883**
	(0.709)	(0.896)
Observations	6327	5259

Figure 1. Estimating missing values for % mountainous terrain